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The Commons And The  
New Age of Laissez Faire1  
 
Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D. 
West Virginia University 
Introduction 
 
We are currently knee-deep in a rather peculiar restoration in 
American public life – one that has tremendous implications for 
the future of nonprofit organization, voluntary action and 
philanthropy.  As recently as two decades ago “nineteenth century 
individualism” and the doctrine of laissez faire were presented in 
our public schools and colleges as anachronisms – simplistic 
foibles from an innocent past transcended by the inevitable 
advance of progress and the growth of society. (Reisman, 19XX)  
Many social scientists – probably including many futurists –
 would still adhere to this view. 
Yet, here we are on the verge of not only a new century but also a 
new millennium, and, laissez faire , the doctrine of 
noninterference in the affairs of others, which finds expression in 
ideas of individual entrepreneurship, rugged individualism, the 
sanctification of capital, the monism of the marketplace and the 
doctrine that freedom is primarily an economic, not a political, 
concern has once again become the de facto  vocabulary of a 
broad segment of American public life.  One of the principal 
characteristics of the emergence of this new laissez faire is the 
way in which it has moved nonprofit organizations, voluntary 
action, philanthropy and other community institutions off the 
public agenda and out of public rhetoric. 
This shift in public discourse has occurred at the end of the Cold 
War when the United States has emerged as the dominant 
superpower in the new world order, so that what is said (and not 
said) in American public debate is heard around the world.  Even 
those who disagree strongly with this new resurgence of 
individualism are forced to take note. 
                                                 
1 Presented at the meeting of the World Future Society. Atlanta 
GA   July 19, 1995. 
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I’m not here today to debate the pros and cons of the return of 
laissez faire  to the American public agenda or to promote any 
alternative visions of the welfare state, big government, 
collectivism or communitarianism.  My only concern is to point 
out that laissez faire visions of the future being promoted today 
are dangerously limited in at least one important respect:  They 
omit any reference to nonprofit organizations, voluntary action or 
philanthropy (along with sustaining reference groups like family 
and support and friendship groups) as operative parts of the 
future.  Instead, they offer an altogether familiar bi-polar social 
universe from the past composed of “the state” (a.k.a. “big 
government”) and “the individual” (which appears to include such 
fictive “individuals” as Fortune 500 corporations).  In some 
alternate versions, this new laissez-faire  may also find a place for 
“state and local government” in contast to the “big” (that is, 
federal) government. 
The one thing new laissez faire rhetoric seldom does is find any 
place for broader visions of civil society, and in particular, 
nonprofit organizations, voluntary action,  or philanthropy which 
have been such important parts of the American past. 
Two Visions of Democracy 
There have in fact always been not one, but two distinct, visions 
of democracy and the open society active in the American 
context, each with many variations:  On the one hand, there is the 
liberal individualist vision which draws its sustenance largely 
from Hobbes and Locke and the English utilitarians.  In an 
important subset of this liberal individualism running from 
Benthamite utilitarianism through the Austrian School, economic 
freedoms (entrepreneurship and free trade) are treated as the 
ultimate measures of a free world. 
On the other hand, sources as diverse as Alexis deTocqueville, 
Frank Lloyd Wright and John Dewey have accentuated more 
pluralistic and communitarian visions of free societies.  
Tocqueville has long been recognized for his insights on the role 
of voluntary associations as intermediate institutions between the 
coercive powers of the state and the freedom of the individual 
citizen.  A half-century ago, Wright's Broadacre City and Usonian 
House emerged as profoundly important influences on the built 
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environment of contemporary urbanism.  (Rosenbaum, 1993; 
Sergeant, 1976)  Much of what is disparaged as “liberal” in 
contemporary political rhetoric bears some connection to the 
pragmatic liberalism first articulated by Dewey. 
The resurgent rhetoric of laissez faire individualism in American 
public life has driven discussion of such “collective” or 
“cooperative” concerns as nonprofit organizations, voluntary 
action and philanthropy completely out of the realm of public 
issues, and resulted in the spread of a highly skewed conception 
of communities as consisting only of home, work and school.  
Such familar institutions as churches, synagogues and mosques, 
neighborhoods, clubs, societies, organizations, social service, 
fund raising, volunteering, are omitted from new laissez faire  
discussions of community, which is treated solely in terms of 
work, home and school. 
This is not primarily a directional, or politically motivated, 
critique:  Indeed, the last major public image of this sort may well 
have been George Bush’s “Thousand Points of Light” which 
emphasized volunteering. Conservative and liberal nonprofit 
institutions, voluntary associations, philanthropic organizations 
and political organizations are equally absent from the newlaissez 
faire  visions of the future: the Heritage Foundation as well as the 
Brookings Institution; the Christian Coalition and the National 
Council of Churches; the Republican Party as well as the 
Democrats.  What is important here is not any ideological bias but 
a pervasive silence. 
 
We-Groups 
My critique is directional, however, in that I am largely 
uninterested in the nonprofit benefactories – those tax-exempt 
nonprofit service corporations – that increasingly draw the main 
body of attention by those interested in "the third sector".  My 
principal interest is, instead, in the commons – those clubs, 
congregations, membership organizations, self-help and support 
groups, peer- and friendship groups and other “we-groups”.  Such 
entities, characterized by uncoerced participation, shared purposes 
and resources, mutuality and indigenous standards of fairness are, 
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in my view, fundamental expressions of human plurality and 
basic to human freedom.  (Lohmann, 1992) 
I do not intend to suggest that the new laissez faire  rhetoric of 
today means that President Clinton or Speaker Gingrich, or Ross 
Perow or any of the manifold other American public figures from 
whom we regularly hear it are ignorant of these commons or 
believe there will be no nonprofit organizations, voluntary action 
or philanthropy in our future.  No political figure, even an 
exceptionally wealthy one, can expect to carry on for long without 
volunteers and donations! 
What is truly remarkable, however, is the distinctive way in 
which the new laissez faire is characterized by an impoverished 
public rhetoric in which community institutions other than home, 
school and work simply do not appear.  There is remarkably little 
mention in public discourse today of clubs and associations, 
congregations, museums, theaters, social services, civic groups, 
foundations or any of the manifold other nonprofit organizations, 
voluntary associations and philanthropic institutions which are 
regarded around the world as one of the distinctive marks of 
American Civilization. 
Yet, the new laissez fair  has banished them from public 
discourse.  Contemporary expressions of the influence of the new 
laissez faire  on a diminished sense of the commons and common 
goods are easy to locate.  Indeed, it is the wide and rapid spread 
of this feeble vision of the future American community which is 
one of its most interesting features.  It can be found (or rather, not 
found) in just about any contemporary public expression: in such 
diverse places as the Republican Party’s Contract for America, 
(Gingrich, 1995); a speech by the Director of the Futurist society 
in Michigan (Glazer, 1995);  Clinton Administration proposals for 
the National Information Infrastructure;  an interesting and 
farsighted economic development document entitled Blue Print 
for a 21st Century Community, (Joint Venture: Silicon Valley , 
1994) recent presentations to this society and even works by the 
head of the communitarian political movement in the U.S. 
(Etzioni, 1993)   
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“Contract For America” 
It is hard to remember a single document drafted by elected public 
officials which has had more immediate and dramatic impact that 
the Republican Contract for America  in 1994.  In a cynical age 
when “political” writing by public officials consists mostly of 
leaked staff memos, ghost-written campaign biographies fine 
tuned to the issues of a particular campaign and  memoirs 
emphasizing the “kiss and tell” peccadilloes of the subject, it is 
hard to think of another statement of political objectives and 
intentions quite like the Contract.   For this reason alone,  its 
vision of the commons should be of interest – if it contained one. 
The text of the Contract contains no direct or indirect references 
to political parties, citizenship or community action, civil society 
and it certainly contains no references to community or 
commonwealth or the larger body of apolitical nonprofit 
organizations, voluntary associations or philanthropic institutions 
(not even that marvel of modern political philanthropy, the 
political action committee, or PAC).  The reasons for such an 
obvious omission are open to several possible interpretations.  
Fortunately, we may be able to get some help in interpreting it 
from one of the authors. 
In the current issue of The Futurist, one of the leading architects 
of the Contract, House Speaker Newt Gingrich, articulates his 
vision of “an opportunity society” which would, he suggests, 
represent a “renewed American Civilization” and a replacement 
for the American “welfare state.” (Gingrich, 1995) Gingrich 
appropriates Tocqueville’s Democracy in America as his primary 
source to identify what he labels the “collection of values, 
principles, habits and institutions (which) could be grouped 
together as ‘American Civilization’”.  Yet, among those defining 
values, he mentions only “free enterprise in a free market, 
entrepreneurship, productivity, incentives and the work ethic, 
citizenship, the rule of law, the right to free speech and free 
elections.”  Tocqueville’s seminal comments on associations in 
America and the role of voluntary association as intermediate 
between the individual and state are not mentioned. 
In fact, in the Gingrich Futurist  article, there is but a single, 
incidental reference to third sector institutions of any type.  He 
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notes that “such a transformation (that is, a balanced budget 
together with a redefinition of government) would require a deep 
shift in popular thinking about the role of the federal government 
compared with the roles of the citizen, voluntary associations 
(including religious institutions), private business, and local and 
state government.”  Given the important roles which voluntary 
associations, including religious institutions, have played in 
American public life during the past century, and the kind of 
absence of any mention in Gingrich’s (and other new laissez 
faire) works, one can only ask whether such a redefinition 
involves simply writing voluntary organization out of the public 
equation altogether. 
The answer, paradoxical as it may seem, appears to be “yes.”  
One of the things that make the new laissez-faire of Gingrich and 
others especially interesting is its paradoxical – even self-denying 
– connection to the claim that a new “Third Wave” civilization is 
emerging.  In the immediate past issue of The Futurist, for 
example, Alvin and Heidi Toffler write “we are living through the 
birth pangs of a new civilization whose institutions are not yet in 
place.  A fundamental skill needed by policy-makers, politicians 
and politically active citizens today – if they really want to know 
what they are doing – is, therefore, the ability to distinguish 
between proposals designed to keep the tottering Second Wave 
system on life-support from those that ease the growth of the next, 
Third Wave, civilization.”  (Toffler and Toffler, 1995) 
One might concede their claims that a new “Third Wave” 
civilization is emerging to replace the old industrial order and that 
it is advisable that barriers to the new civilization be removed, 
rather than, for example, asking the new order to test its mettle by 
overcoming those barriers.  In making such concessions, however, 
it seems fair to ask, whether the kind of laissez-faire, atomistic 
individualism, which sees life as, consisting only of home, work 
and school is not, itself, one of those barriers? 
World Future Society 
At a previous conference, for example, John Vasconcellos, a 
California state assemblyman and keynote speaker at the 
conference said, "All U.S. institutions are 'in terrible dysfunction.'  
(Note the word “all.”)  In clarifying his point, Vasconcellos said, 
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“These include families, schools, the health-care and criminal 
justice systems, and governments."  Three conclusions seem 
plausible:  The author, an elected public official in a large urban 
state, is unaware of third sector.  Third sector institutions are so 
inconsequential they are not worthy of mention.  Or, third sector 
institutions are not among those in terrible dysfunction, and 
therefore, presumably worth looking at as part of any plausible 
solution. 
William E. Halal, professor of management at George 
Washington Univ., echoed a familiar “third wave” theme in his 
claim that we are witnessing "the collapse of the Industrial Age 
model of institutions" which posit that centrally planned 
bureaucracies can be trusted to solve our problems."  In a classical 
new laissez faire leap, "What's needed, said Halal, is for 
institutions to put the ideals of democratic free enterprise into 
practice.  For example, some corporations are establishing 
internal markets, and parents, teachers, and local citizens in 
Chicago are elected to run their own schools."   
The message here is clear:  private action is market action.  This 
central message of the new laissez faire effectively defines the 
third sector out of existence.  All voluntary behavior other than 
profit seeing and consumption is irrational and inefficient, all 
donative and philanthropic behavior is suspect. 
“The Future of Michigan” 
The new laissez-faire is not only operative in national political 
rhetoric.  One also finds that it has a strong influence upon 
economic development discussions – particularly as those 
discussions focus on the future of electronic technology.  
In April of this year, I presented a paper at a conference on the 
application of information technology to nonprofits at Michigan 
State University.  The keynote speaker who kicked off the 
conference was a futurist and executive director of a nonprofit 
organization called Michigan Futures, Inc.  He presented a 
detailed and elegant vision of the future impact of computers in 
the homes, communities and companies of what is still one of the 
nation’s largest industrial states.   
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I was more interested, however, in what he didn’t say than what 
he did.  Keep in mind, he was presenting to a conference on 
computers and nonprofit organizations, attended by 
approximately 200 staff, board members and volunteers 
associated with local, regional and statewide nonprofit 
organizations in Michigan.  Yet, the speech contained nothing 
about the future impact of computers on churches, synagogues, 
mosques, human service agencies, membership associations, civic 
clubs, private colleges or any other known or recognizable 
nonprofit organizations, voluntary associations or philanthropic 
activities.  He didn’t mention any potential implications for civic 
friendship or citizenship.  He didn’t refer to the revolutionary 
impact computer data bases are already having on fund-raising, or 
the potential they have for community organizing.  His references 
to the information superhighway (a.k.a., the National Information 
Infrastructure) made no mention of the attempts by the Network 
for Civic Computing and others to generate discussion of the 
future role for an electronic commons.  
The conclusion seems unmistakable:  In the view of this informed 
futurist, there is no future worth commenting on when it comes to 
the commons.   
Please do not misunderstand me:  It was an excellent speech, well 
written and well delivered.  Indeed, it is in part because of the 
author’s command of his subject and his rhetorical 
accomplishment that the omissions were so glaring.  For what 
suddenly struck me was the degree to which the speaker was 
presenting the conventional wisdom of American public life 
today.  I think that conventional wisdom about the future – which 
I have already referred to as the new laissez faire – consists of 
two important premises: 
 
1. Communities consist of three domains: home, school and 
work. 
 a. Work is where people engage in one of the two 
central events of life.  (Production) 
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 b. Home is the place of respite from productive work 
(leisure) and the center for the other essential life activity 
(consumption). 
 c. School is what young people do to prepare for 
work.  (No preparation for shopping is deemed essential.) 
2. Liberating private initiative from the shackles of public 
oppression is the major  
I’m not suggesting that people in general have such a narrow, 
constricted view of life.  I’m saying that in so far as public 
officials, business and community leaders today are able to apply 
a widely shared “consensus” public ideology to public issues this 
seems to be the vision of community it contains.   This isn’t the 
vision of the future you will hear, of course, at Memorial Day or 
4th of July speeches, in sermons, political party caucuses or at the 
annual meetings of community organizations should you be one 
of the dwindling minority of people still in attendance.  It is, 
however, the vision you will see peeking through public 
discussions of all sorts when people are about other tasks – such 
as discussing the role of government or further applications of 
computer technology.   
“Blue Print for a 21st Century Community” 
One of the singularly telling documents on the late 20th century 
estimation of the impact of information technology on the 
development of society is the report Blue Print for a 21st Century 
Community.  The Phase II Report issued by an economic 
development task force called Joint Venture: Silicon Valley in 
June 1993.  The report is available on the Internet, and prints out 
at 57 pages of 12 pt. Palatino (the same size as the type on this 
page). 
Based on the title, (an impression supported by the introduction) 
you would anticipate that this was to be a comprehensive 
planning study of the future of the region in its political, social 
and economic multiplicity.  You would anticipate also that – 
given the title – community would figure prominently in the 
presentation. 
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Because of the uniquely innovative role of the valley in the 
development of the information society, it offers in several 
respects a bellwether image of the future.  As the report itself says 
“No other region in the world can yet match the combination of 
our strong entrepreneurial culture, diverse pool of knowledge 
workers, or breadth of leading-edge companies.” 
The report itself was the product of a task force consisting of 
“more than 1,000 business, government and community leaders in 
Silicon Valley.”  The organization of Silicon Valley, as a 21st 
century community if one is to believe the detailed discussions of 
the report, will consist only of business, local government, 
education and health care.   
The most remarkable finding of this report is that the third sector 
is completely missing from the vision of the future put forth by 
this group.  Education is primarily a local government function, 
and contemporary health care is a major industry.  There is some 
inchoate desire within the report, yearning to break free and 
provide more fulsome recognition of the real complexity of 
community life.  It is reflected in subheadings like “The Danger: 
Companies Win, Community Loses”.  But it never breaks free 
into any actual discussion. 
Future industry in the valley is seen as divided into seven export-
oriented clusters.  Four of these – semiconductors, computer/ 
communications, defense/space and business services – have been 
the traditional core of the region.  Three others – software, 
bioscience and environment – are seen as future emergents. 
In a section entitled “Creating the 21st Century Community, we 
find echoes of the Toffler, Future Shock rhetoric:   “Creating ... a 
21st Century Community will require that people, companies, and 
organizations work together in new, collaborative ways.”  No 
details are provided, however, on what such collaborations may 
consist of or how they may be organized. 
Yet, in what sounds like a curiously second wave rendering, 
“community infrastructure” is defined on a subsequent page as 
“highly skilled people, advanced telecommunications capacity, 
information networks, and other resources” which are “(as) 
quality oriented in terms of customer satisfaction, cycle time 
reduction, and flexibility as the companies it (sic) supports.”  This 
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leads to the admonition that “Only a community in which firms, 
institutions, and individuals collaborate easily and effectively can 
produce such an infrastructure.” 
Communities also have an important public relations value:  “To 
maintain a high standard of living in a relatively high cost area, 
Silicon Valley should have a reputation as a region whose 
infrastructure helps companies generate a relatively higher levels 
of value.  Firms looking for adaptable and responsive community 
partners that help provide the foundation for high-value-added 
work-including high-skilled workers, fast and efficient regulatory 
processes, tax systems that encourages business investment, and a 
telecommunications infrastructure that is second to none.” 
Approaching the issue of taxes in the post-modern world can be 
tricky:  “The fundamental problem is that Silicon Valley (as a 
community?) is not capturing enough of the value that the 
region’s companies are generating.  Dramatic changes in 
corporate organization and practices have led to dramatically 
higher output per employee in area firms.  Even as Silicon Valley 
reels from recession, individual companies are doing better than 
ever.  Earnings and productivity are skyrocketing.”  
“A culture of conflict and blame has hurt the ability of the public 
and private sectors to work together to solve major problems.  
The inability to organize regional assets and build a ‘collaborative 
advantage’ through strong working relationships is a major reason 
that Silicon Valley has not reached its full potential.” 
“As employers and neighbors and parents we are, moreover, 
confronted with the reality that key segments of our population – 
young people, the lower-skilled – struggle to participate in the 
quality of life of our region.  Brain drain, a growing 
disenfranchised population, and increasingly difficulty recruiting 
new employees to the area have become serious economic and 
social issues.” 
“The success of a high-performance community must be 
measured by increases in the standard of living (real wages and 
real per capita income), not simply by job creation or population 
growth.” 
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“Silicon Valley will be both technology drive and relationship 
driven.  Traditionally, Silicon Valley has been primarily 
technology driven...Silicon Valley must now be more market-
driven and technology must be rapidly commercialized through a 
series of dynamic supplier-customer relationships.  In the 21st 
Century, Silicon Valley will be the most adept region in the world 
in forging relationships necessary for rapid technological 
innovation and use.” 
“Silicon Valley will enjoy strong connections between its global 
companies and its local communities.... Many global firms...are 
learning to develop strong relationships in each of the regions 
where they operate.”   
One of the Joint Venture initiatives was the “Smart Valley” 
initiative which “provides a vision of an ‘electronic community’ 
that brings the full power of information technologies to 
fundamentally change the way industry, government and 
education work together to create advantage through 
collaboration.  The electronic network linking companies, 
universities, government agencies, and individuals enables the 
Valley to achieve a higher level of productivity and greatly 
expanded options for both people and firms in applications 
ranging from electronic commerce and distance learning to health 
care information.”   
“The 21st Century Workforce initiative acts as a catalyst to 
connect schools, businesses, and homes into a new learning 
system that transcends traditional boundaries.” 
“The cost of doing business in the Valley is reduced through the 
effective use of information technologies and closer relationships 
between business and government.  An electronic regulatory 
clearinghouse reduces paperwork burdens while wide 
dissemination of local performance standards in the permitting 
process cuts down on cycle-time delay.  The Silicon Valley 
Economic Development Team operates ‘smart teams’ to help 
identify and reduce barriers to business expansion and retention.” 
“Community partners work toward a common set of goals for 
higher real incomes, increasing quality of life, and expanding 
opportunities.  Information technologies invented in the Valley 
are now employed to help make this happen.  New relationships 
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sustained by information networks enable new levels of 
cooperation in addressing education, regulatory, technology and 
enterprise challenges.”  Among the “key needs” identified by the 
report at later points are “an industry ‘voice’ at the regional, state 
and federal levels”; a “pro-manufacturing tax structure”; 
application of ‘computers/communication technologies to 
community problems’ and an ‘industry voice to advocate for 
comprehensive tax reform’. 
The Third Sector Paradox 
Despite its apparently complete blindness to the third sector, “To 
begin phase III implementation, the Joint Venture: Silicon Valley 
Network has been incorporated as a new nonprofit organization to 
sustain the work of specific initiatives and continue to forge 
linkages between new and existing community activities.”  At a 
later point in the report, we learn that “Smart Valley, Inc. is a 501 
(c) (6) nonprofit organization governed by an eight-member board 
of directions and affiliated with Joint Venture: Silicon Valley 
Network.” 
The Smart Valley vision of community is somewhat more 
expansive: It includes “technology providers, service providers, 
applications developers and end users.” 
Indirect support for my conclusion that the composition of groups 
and the identification of issues accurately reflects the interests of 
participants is provided by the following description of the ways 
in which the original task structure was expanded:  “The 
prevalence of telecommunications and networking concerns 
among Working Groups led to the creation of a ‘Smart Valley’ 
information infrastructure group.  Concern about the cost of and 
access to health care launched a Health Care Task Force.  Joint 
Venture also created a Diversity Task Force to ensure more 
broad-based participation in Industry and Infrastructure Working 
Groups.”  Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if there were any 
genuine sentiment among participants for a more expanded vision 
of community, it probably would have resulted in the addition of 
other specialized subcommittees directed toward that end. 
“The Bay Area is the ideal location to begin the implementation 
of the National Information Infrastructure.” 
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“The JVSV process helped create or support four specific pilot 
projects.”  An electronic training network for those already in the 
labor force; school-to-work transition for “those about to enter the 
work force from high school;”  (drop outs?) a regional 
educational clearinghouse for sharing best practices for K-12; and 
a Better Learning Through Technology initiative to improve the 
use of technology in education. 
An “initiative to reduce the cost of doing business” in the Valley 
by promoting “an efficient, consistent, and reasonable regulatory 
environment while maintaining high safety standards.”  It has 
three principle foci:  regulatory forum, council on tax and fiscal 
policy and health care task force. 
There is nothing at all unusual about this group.  In fact, I picked 
it because it is probably typical of the mainline community and 
economic development interests in the U.S. today.  JVSV 
Network board list includes 25 members:  Twelve appear to 
represent (mostly small) commercial interests.  Four members are 
identifiably with local government, and two are state 
representatives.  Two are representatives of higher education and 
one is a local school representative.  Others represent Labor 
Council, Chamber of Commerce, Sierra Club, Economic and 
Social Opportunities, Inc., Asian Americans for Community 
Development. 
National Information Infrastructure 
It may not simply be the forms of nonprofit, voluntary and 
philanthropic organization that are vetoed by the new laissez 
faire.  Also suspect are various forms of common goods.  This is 
clearly illustrated by the way in which the existing “fair use” 
doctrine has become a target of proposals to modify the existing 
copyright law in the U.S. 
A recent analysis in the Chronicle of Higher Education concluded 
that "(i)f the publishing and software industries have their way 
with the revision of the U.S. Copyright Act, any copying in the 
realm of electronic information that is not authorized by the 
copyright owner will be illegal.   
"While nearly everyone agrees that copyrights need to be 
protected from infringement on the emerging information 
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superhighway (formally known as the National Information 
Infrastructure) most people are not aware that publishers and 
software producers are seeking an absolute monopoly on the right 
to digitize, store, and transmit copyrighted information.  Once in 
complete control of the rights to electronic information, they 
intend to offer licenses and contracts that will define the extent to 
which information users may (or may not) read, browse, print, 
copy, share, lend or retransmit copyrighted works. (Frazier, 1995) 
"The legal framework for this seemingly paranoid vision of the 
future is clearly outlined in the "Preliminary Report of the 
Working Group on Intellectual Property," released in July, 1994 
which was produced by the Information Infrastructure Task Force 
of the U. S. Department of Commerce...Representatives of the 
Clinton Administration have said that the preliminary report is on 
the right track. 
"(The) report proposes that the copyright holder be given the 
exclusive right to 'transmit' a copyrighted work. 
"The report also recommends eliminating the 'doctrine of first 
sale' for electronic information.  In the world of paper 
publications, the doctrine affirms the commonsense notion that, 
once bought, a book can be resold, lent, rented or given away 
without the permission of the copyright holder. 
Finally, so that no one tampers with the security systems of this 
brave new information infrastructure, the report proposes that 
existing copyright laws be revised to prohibit devices, products 
and services that 'defeat technological methods of preventing 
unauthorized use." 
If It Ain’t Broke, Break It 
This approach would, of course, effectively nullify “fair use” 
doctrines that currently allow certain forms of copying for 
educational and public interest reasons.  It would also effectively 
eliminate knowledge dissemination and public discourse as 
common goods in favor of a laissez faire vision of the 
unconditional property rights of the authors and publishers.  As an 
example, all of the quotations in this presentation are done within 
the terms of scholarly fair use.  Obtaining explicit permission 
from each of the copyright holders in question would have been 
an onerous but necessary task. 
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There is a maximum irony in this, in that the Internet was 
originally created out of what is one of the few genuine, global 
public interests – survival of nuclear holocaust.  It’s most 
successful features – newsgroups, email list servers, MOO’s, 
bulletin boards, and most spectacularly, the World Wide Web – 
all have the character of commons, rather than markets.  That is, 
voluntary participation, shared purposes and resources, a strong 
sense of mutuality characterize them.  While commercial, profit-
making access services (such as Compuserve, AmericaOnLine 
and Prodigy) appear to be thriving, to date commercial visions of 
what Nicholas von Hoffman calls “electrotainment” have been 
notably unsuccessful.  (von Hoffman, 1995) 
I am not holding this proposal up as a shibboleth:  There is little 
doubt that such proposals, if passed into law, would prove as 
unworkable as 35 mph speed limits on interstate highways, and 
would ultimately prove unconstitutional under any sane 
interpretation of the First Amendment.  I hold them up here 
primarily as additional examples of new laissez faire policy 
proposals and their tendency to dismiss any aspect of cooperative, 
shared, voluntary, collaborative endeavors.   
Communitarianism 
The resurgence of individualist and entrepreneurial rhetoric in 
American public life that I am calling the New Laissez Faire has 
proven to be very strong medicine in our era.   
The laissez faire influence has been so strong, in fact, that even 
communitarians have proven, somewhat paradoxically, 
susceptible to its influence, and in particular to its vision of 
community as home, work and school.  Evidence for this 
conclusion can be found, for example, in the article by a leading 
communitarian spokesman, the sociologist Amatai Etzioni, in the 
November-December, 1993 issue of The Futurist.  
In that article, Etzioni sounds a major communitarian theme 
which has also been taken up by advocates of the new laissez 
faire :  "Historians will look back on the 1990's, I believe, and see 
them as a period in which the reconstruction of American society 
took place...”.   
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Etzioni’s preferred reconstruction, however, is quite distinct from 
the new laissez faire emphasis on diminishing central government 
taxation and regulation:  “From a preoccupation with rights, 
American society is moving to demand that people shoulder their 
responsibilities and pay greater attention to the needs of their 
families and communities."  Yet, in a curious concession to the 
laissez faire view, all of his examples of resurgent “community” 
involve the laissez faire formula of either families or schools.  
It would be easy to suggest that this is merely a temporary 
oversight.  However, in a keynote speech to the International 
Society for Third Sector Research in Pecs, Hungary last summer, 
the absence of all but the most cursory references to third sector 
organizations or commons was as evident in Etzioni’s as in the 
speech by Glazer noted above.  Moreover, examination of the 
platform of the communitarian party and Etzioni’s communitarian 
manifesto will reveal much the same gaps.   
I am currently reviewing the writings of communitarians, and can 
note that with a few major exceptions, the vision of community 
espoused by communitarians is largely lacking in any attention to 
nonprofit organizations, voluntary action or philanthropy.  
Explicit references to nonprofit organizations, voluntary action 
and philanthropy are conspicuous mostly by their absence from 
most communitarian writings.   
This trend is paradoxical in at least two distinct ways:  First, even 
though they may not be recognized, many forms of association 
will continue.  Secondly, the very absence of recognition is 
contributing to dangerous new expressions of organized 
alienation, like the militia movement.  Thirdly, the growth of 
laissez faire in this country is preventing Americans from seeing 
one major aspect of the emerging new world order: a “global 
associational revolution” in which traditional American values 
regarding the political, civil and social importance of voluntary 
association and nonprofit organization are being disseminated 
throughout the world. 
In the age of the new laissez faire, proposals like Harlan 
Cleveland’s call in the Futurist for a global commons to supervise  
‘the common heritage of mankind’ go largely unheeded.  
(Cleveland, 1993) 
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"Havel himself mentions the need 'to invent new organizational 
structures appropriate to the present multicultural age.... 
"We can also do far more to encourage a healthy 
development of the social sciences, which have given 
occasional demonstrations of their power to help us 
understand more clearly our psychological and institutional 
failings.  Up to now, the social sciences have been poorly 
supported and often corrupted by ideologies and special 
interests, but that could change in the future.  A reformed 
social science might show us how to overcome many of the 
obstacles to cultural understanding and global peace." 
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